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Developing financial markets and operating  
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1. Introduction 
A central bank needs to frame and to set monetary policy at the strategic level. It also needs 
to adopt operating procedures to implement its chosen policy. This is where the rubber hits 
the road. In this image the road is the underlying banking and financial markets. They 
change over time, and the appropriate monetary operating procedures will change over time 
with them. This paper explores the reciprocal relationship between developing financial 
markets and conducting monetary policy operations. Its intended audience is central bankers 
in East Asia, but it draws on experience outside the region. 
This paper develops three themes in each direction of the reciprocal relationship. Each pair 
of themes includes two analytic statements and a policy recommendation.  
Section 2 of the paper argues how monetary operations can contribute to financial 
development. The first theme here is that there are typically degrees of freedom in 
conducting monetary operations. The second theme is that the choices made in respect of 
operating procedures are fateful for financial development in that whatever instruments and 
markets the central bank uses for its operations will tend to gain liquidity and breadth. The 
third theme follows as a consequence: the central bank should use its degree of freedom in 
performing monetary operations consciously to further financial market development. An 
immediate implication is that the right choices of instruments and markets will depend on the 
current state of financial market developments.  
Section 3 argues that, while policymakers make important choices in conducting monetary 
policy operations, they cannot make any choices they want. Financial developments and 
financial development constrain monetary operations in three ways. First, the balance sheets 
of the government and the central bank limit operations. Second, financial development in 
general and the balance between the banking system and securities markets, in particular, 
shape the choice of instruments in executing monetary policy. Third, the central bank should 
align its operating choices to the state of financial development.  
2.  Operating procedures serving financial development 
The burden of the argument of the first half of this paper is that there are synergies between 
the central bank objectives of monetary stability and financial development. These arise from 
the degrees of freedom in the asset and liability composition of the central bank balance 
sheet under modern central banking. Given that central bank operations will tend to impart 
liquidity to the chosen instruments, the central bank can make its choices with an eye to 
developing financial markets.  
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2.1  The degrees of freedom in conducting monetary operations 
The dominant monetary policy approaches nowadays do not carry with them a theory or a 
prescription for the central bank balance sheet. Fiat monetary systems managed with a view 
to stabilising inflation and growth, with or without formal inflation targeting, have no particular 
implications for the balance sheet of the central bank (Papadia and Würtz (2007)). On the 
asset side, such systems are indifferent to domestic or foreign assets, sovereign or private 
obligations, and permanent or frequently reversed transactions. Such systems share 
banknotes as a liability but can operate with bank reserves adequate for no more than 
clearing purposes, or with required reserves, whether remunerated or not. 
This point can be made in terms of the schematic diagram below (Ho (2007)). The varying 
choices with respect to, from right to left, ultimate goals, intermediate targets, and operating 
targets are compatible with a range of instrument choices.  
The tactical and strategic aspects of monetary policy 
Strategy Implementation/Tactics
Instruments
Ultimate 
goal(s)
Operating 
target(s)
Intermediate 
target(s)
•Reserve requirements
•Lending/depo facilities
•Outright transactions
•Reversed transactions
•FX operations
•Direct controls, etc
•Price stability
•Growth
•Competitiveness
•etc
•Reserve money
•Market interest rates
•Exchange rate
•etc
•Money supply
•Inflation rate
•Exchange rate
•etc
 
It is helpful to contrast this state of affairs with monetary approaches that carried clear 
implications for the central bank’s balance sheet, the “real bills” doctrine and the currency 
board approach. The “real bills” doctrine of central banking embodied in the original Federal 
Reserve Act had a theory on the proper assets of the central bank: discounts against short-
term, self-liquidating obligations of the private sector and gold. A central bank that held or 
discounted government paper, by contrast, was thought to court inflation. In retrospect, of 
course, the “real bills” doctrine has been criticised as offering no proof against an inflationary 
monetary policy and as pro-cyclic. Whatever its flaws as a monetary regime, however, this 
doctrine had a theory on what the central bank and, by extension, the banking system should 
carry as assets. 
Similarly, the currency board approach carries clear implications for the monetary authority’s 
balance sheet. It requires a match of gold, silver or foreign exchange against its banknotes 
outstanding. For example, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2007, pp 93–94) earmarks 
part of its foreign assets as a “backing portfolio”, which “holds highly liquid US dollar-
denominated securities to provide full backing to the Monetary Base as required under the 
Currency Board arrangements”. As it happens, this backing portfolio only represents a 
portion of the Exchange Fund’s foreign assets, with the balance having as its counterparts 
accumulated fiscal surpluses and essentially the net worth of the Exchange Fund. Thus, the 
Exchange Fund’s assets and liabilities can be seen as a “currency board plus”, but for the 
present purpose the aspect worth emphasis is that the currency board part has implications 
for assets, liabilities and the relationship between them. 128  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
It is worth pausing to marvel at how modern monetary approaches have elaborated the three 
right-hand elements in the diagram above, even as they have fallen silent on the first. The 
result is that the operations of monetary policy take place in increasing isolation from the 
strategy of monetary policy. While central bankers pay attention to operations,
2 it is the rare 
monetary economist who casts a glance at the operational side of policy (Friedman (1999) 
and Woodford (2000)). 
For the present purpose, the orphan status of operations creates an opportunity. This is 
because the choice of operating instruments makes a difference to the evolution of financial 
markets, as argued in the next section. 
2.2  Monetary operations and financial market liquidity 
The choice of a particular operating instrument tends to have positive external effects on the 
liquidity of the chosen market. Examples of such effects can be given from the Federal 
Reserve’s history and more recent Asian history. The prospect, all too transitory in 
retrospect, of the US Treasury running surpluses to an extent that the Federal Reserve 
would have had to change its operating procedures’ reliance on Treasury securities led to a 
useful (if ultimately moot) re-examination of alternatives (Broaddus and Goodfriend (2001), 
Kohn (2002), Marshall (2002) and McCauley (2002)). 
The original Federal Reserve Act: support for the bankers’ acceptance market 
The 1913 Act sought to develop a market in the United States for the financing of US foreign 
trade. Theretofore US trade had been financed in Europe, mostly in London. This was 
thought to be an undesirable state of affairs both from the standpoint of the cost and from the 
standpoint of currency exposure, since the London acceptances were denominated in 
sterling (LaRoche (1993)).
3 
The Act provided two incentives for the relocation of the financing of US trade. It made 
bankers’ acceptances (BAs) eligible for discount or outright purchase by the new Federal 
Reserve and exempted the acceptance liability from reserve requirements. The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York also purchased acceptances for the account of foreign central 
banks, adding its signature and in effect making the private paper into a government 
obligation.  
The developmental use of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet worked. Although Federal 
Reserve holdings of BAs declined in World War I, they came by the late 1920s to finance a 
third to a half of US imports and exports (LaRoche (1993, p 134)). In practice, the Federal 
Reserve both bought BAs outright and entered into repurchase agreements against them. It 
held on average a third of the outstanding stock and at times half. In terms of the Fed’s 
portfolio these holdings of private paper bulked larger than holdings of Treasury paper before 
the US entry into World War I and in 1923, 1926 and 1928 (see graph below). 
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Note: Holdings of BAs in the early years include puchases under repo agreements. 
Source: Meulendyke (1998, p 22). 
Federal Reserve support for the BA market resumed in 1955 but never reached the levels 
seen between the World Wars. In the 1970s the Federal Reserve concluded that the market 
could stand on its own and ceased endorsing acceptances for its foreign correspondents. In 
1977 outright purchases ceased and in 1984 repos against BAs ceased. BAs’ exemption 
from reserve requirements boosted outstandings in the high-inflation and high interest rate 
years of the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the subsequent reduction of reserve 
requirements for large certificates of deposit and Eurodollars in 1990 left BAs little advantage 
over commercial paper and other means to finance trade and the market has since 
languished.  
The Federal Reserve “bills only” controversy, 1953–1961, and market liquidity  
After the post-war agreement with the Treasury in 1951 to unpeg interest rates on Treasury 
securities, the Federal Reserve debated whether to operate in Treasury bills only or in the full 
range of Treasury securities. Washington favoured a “bills only” approach while New York 
argued for the flexibility to operate across the yield curve. The differences between 
Washington and New York have usually been pinned on a difference of views on the 
economics of the yield curve or a difference on the need for clarity of goals given the recent 
pegging of long-term rates. On the economics, the Washington position trusted to arbitrage 
across highly substitutable securities of different maturities to transmit the effect of 
operations in short-term bills while New York argued that occasional “limited direct entry into 
the long-term market” could usefully affect the yields on imperfectly substitutable securities 
(Ritter (1980, p 110)). On the clarity of goals, the “approach left longer maturity coupon 
securities free to trade without Federal Reserve interference, helping the market-clearing 
mechanisms to function and emphasizing that longer term interest rates were no longer 
pegged” (Meulendyke (1998, p 35)). 130  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
Whatever the force of these arguments,
4 the effect of the locus of operations on market 
liquidity is an additional, since neglected, difference between the two sides. President Sproul 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York argued in testimony before Congress against the 
claim by Chairman Martin that operations in bills had contributed to the “depth, breadth and 
resiliency” of the Treasury note and bond market. Instead,  
“It is my information and observation that the market for longer term securities 
has remained at least as “thin” under existing open market procedures as it was 
before these procedures were adopted. I think it has lost depth, breadth and 
resiliency, whether you view it in terms of dealer willingness to take position risks, 
volume of trading or erratic price movements” (Ritter (1980, p 108)).  
In short, an important part of the argument for operations in longer-dated coupon securities 
was that they would help make this market segment more liquid. 
Federal Reserve operations in the repo market: nurturing the securities dealers 
Nowadays the Federal Reserve operates in repos to fine-tune the availability of bank 
reserves. Its daily transactions were said by Lumpkin (1993, pp 70 and 73) to amount to 
$1.5–$6 billion in 1992, compared to daily total transactions of $629 billion then reported by 
the primary dealers. The argument for the use of repos has echoes of the argument for bills 
only: by conducting short-term reversed operations, the Federal Reserve does not affect the 
price discovery in the underlying securities. But the original use of repo operations had more 
to do with market development in general, and the nurturing of a group of non-bank 
securities dealers in particular.  
The Federal Reserve’s repo operations in its first 60 years were predominately a means to 
provide liquidity to non-bank dealer firms. Lumpkin (1993, p 69) reports that the Federal 
Reserve conducted repos in 1917 with member banks, but these were discontinued “a few 
years later” until 1975, when bank dealers were made eligible as repo counterparties. In the 
1920s and early 1930s repos were “infrequently” conducted with non-bank dealers. 
Meulendyke (1998, p 27) reports that repos against Treasury securities and BAs would be 
arranged at the initiative of the dealers for periods of up to 15 days, with early repayment 
permitted. At the systemic level, Meulendyke highlights the safety-valve function of such 
dealer-initiated operations, in that they relieved shortages caused by Treasury cash 
management or other autonomous factors. In addition, however, from the standpoint of the 
dealers and their customers, such accommodating transactions with the central bank at 
times of “temporary credit stringency” must have been reassuring.  
After a lull during World War II, repo operations were resumed in mid-1949 (Lumpkin (1993, 
p 70)) or 1951 (Meulendyke (1998, p 37)). The latter notes a shift to operations carried out at 
the Fed’s initiative “to provide temporary, but immediate, reserve assistance to the central 
money market at times of unusual strain on that market” (quoting the New York Fed’s report 
on operations in 1953 to the FOMC).  
“Until the 1970s, RPs were done only with nonbank dealers at preannounced 
rates – usually at or slightly below the discount rate – although beginning in 1968, 
the RP rate was occasionally set slightly above the discount rate. The practice of 
arranging RPs only with nonbank dealers was a holdover from the earlier view 
that RPs served primarily to finance dealer positions in securities. On occasion 
during the 1950s and 1960s, an RP would still be arranged at the request of 
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dealers facing difficulties in financing their positions in the markets. In discussing 
repurchase operations at [one of] the FOMC’s annual reviews [in 1961] Governor 
J. L. Robertson objected to the FOMC’s use of the instrument, arguing that RPs 
were not security purchases in the open market, as authorized by the Federal 
Reserve Act, but were actually loans to dealers… Governor Robertson was 
particularly troubled by the practice at the time of lending through RPs only to 
nonbank dealers and at rates below the discount rate… Most members 
disagreed. They considered RPs to be an appropriate instrument that had proved 
to be of inestimable value in the implementation of monetary policy; their 
continued use was authorized.”
5 
On this reading, before repos became the main Federal Reserve instrument they served to 
nurture non-bank securities dealers. Into the 1960s these could approach the Federal 
Reserve for financing of their government securities. Whether the rate at which the 
transaction could be conducted was in some sense favourable in relation to the rate that 
member banks would pay at the discount window would have been a very secondary 
consideration. The more important impact would have been on the financial management of 
the primary dealers and even more on their customers’ assessment of the counterparty risk 
of the dealer.  
The character of the repo operations subsequently became more symmetrical, more 
competitive and more inclusive. In particular, the introduction of matched sale-purchase 
transactions in 1966 meant that repos could drain as well as inject liquidity, the introduction 
of the “competitive go around” technique of contacting all the primary dealers at once in 1972 
rendered the operation more competitive, and the addition of bank dealers to the list of 
eligible counterparties in 1975 made the operations more inclusive.  
Still, the nurturing of the non-bank dealers continued to have an effect. Lumpkin (1993, p 67) 
cites the attraction of repos to investors subject to “prudent investor” or other types of asset 
restrictions, such as public bodies required to invest tax receipts or the proceeds of bond 
issues in Treasury securities. These could invest in repos against Treasury securities instead 
of buying them outright. In some cases, such investments would be restricted to repos with 
primary dealers designated by the Federal Reserve.  
“Money market mutual funds are also major participants in the RP market… 
Because RPs are deemed to be loans under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 and carry risks not typically associated with direct security investments, 
mutual funds often limit their RP investments to RPs with maturities of seven 
days or less that are arranged with member banks of the Federal Reserve 
System or dealers on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s list of reporting 
dealers.”  
Stepping back, the operations by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the repo market 
not only added transaction volume to this market, but also raised its profile among 
institutional investors. Thus, cash-rich entities like state and local governments more readily 
placed funds in the market, and insurance companies and pensions holding securities more 
readily in effect lent their holdings of Treasury securities to the market-making dealers. 
When, as in the early 1980s with the Drysdale crisis, risky and inconsistent market practices 
were revealed, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury helped write legislation to improve the 
workings of the market. These days, repo transactions between private parties dwarf those 
between private parties and the Federal Reserve. Taking a long and broad view, the Federal 
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Reserve involvement not only helped make the New York repo market among the most liquid 
markets in the world, but also intentionally helped to nurture non-bank securities dealers. 
Asian central banks in the forex swap market vs repo market 
Before the Asian financial crisis, Asian government bond markets tended to be small and 
illiquid, and repurchase markets in them were not well developed. Central banks used 
variations in reserve requirements to varying extents (Dasri (1990)). Open market operations 
were often conducted in short-term foreign exchange swap markets. These in effect served 
as the money market for currencies like the Singapore dollar and the Thai baht. Central bank 
operations not only recognised the liquidity of these markets, but also contributed to them.  
Since the crisis, with the development of government bond markets in the region, the repo 
markets have gained liquidity. Central bank operations in repos in Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand have contributed to liquidity in these markets.
6 Still, owing to limited 
central bank holdings of government paper, large needs to absorb liquidity have tended to be 
met by resorting once again to the foreign exchange swap market, as well as with central 
bank paper in some cases. Thus, Bank Negara Malaysia reports forward purchases of 
dollars of $16.6 billion, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, $9.6 billion, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, $55 billion and the Bank of Thailand $9.5 billion (net) at end June 2007. 
The Bank of Thailand’s choice of the tenor of its repo operations 
If the choice to conduct operations in repo markets has furthered their development in recent 
years, then it would not be surprising if the maturity of the repos chosen for operations had 
an effect on market liquidity. In effect, the Bank of Thailand has conducted two natural 
experiments in the course of its inflation targeting period since May 2000. It first chose to use 
the 14-day repo as its policy rate and operating instrument in May 2000 and then switched to 
the overnight repo rate in January 2007. The immediate impact of both moves was to make 
the market more liquid at the chosen tenor. 
The experiment is easily described. To assess the effect of the choice of policy rate and 
operating instrument on market liquidity, repo transactions at the chosen tenor and at other 
tenors were aggregated over a four-month window before and after the month of each 
change in operating procedures. The null hypothesis is that the change in policy had no 
effect on the distribution of market transactions by maturity of the repo. 
The first move in May 2000 concentrated liquidity into the 14-day maturity, mostly at the 
expense of other term transactions, both 7-day repos and those with maturities of a month or 
over (Table 1). The share of 14-day repos more than doubled to over half. The Chi-square 
statistic confirms the “inter-ocular impact test” and rejects the hypothesis of the 
independence of the policy choice and the tenor of market transactions. 
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Thai repo market turnover by maturity around May 2000 
In billions of baht 
Tenor of repo transactions 
 
14-day Other 
Total 
4 months pre-May 2000    730    2,003    2,733 
4 months post-May 2000    1,549    1,362    2,911 
Total   2,279    3,365    5,644 
Note: The Chi-square statistic for the independence of the choice of operating tenor and market turnover is 
410.8, while the critical value for p < .0001 is 10.83.  
Sources: Bank of Thailand; author’s calculations.  Table 1
 
Nevertheless, overnight repos became the most transacted tenor, especially as interest rates 
were raised from mid-2004. Thus, one can interpret the shift by the Bank of Thailand to the 
overnight repo in January 2008 either as a response to this market development or as a 
response to certain central banks abandoning the 14-day repo as the focus of policy (Ho 
(2007)). However one interprets the policy move, it led to further concentration of liquidity in 
the overnight tenor (Table 2). 
 
Thai repo market turnover by maturity around January 2007 
In billions of baht 
Tenor of repo transactions 
 
Overnight Other 
Total 
4 months pre-January 2007    4,870    2,746    7,615 
4 months post-January 2007    6,935    2,349    9,284 
Total   11,805    5,095    16,900 
Note: The Chi-square statistic for the independence of the choice of operating tenor and market turnover is 
229.7, while the critical value for p < .0001 is 10.83.  
Sources: Bank of Thailand; author’s calculations.  Table 2 
 
While the shift to the overnight repo can be interpreted as the response of operating 
procedures to market development, the two natural experiments provide strong evidence that 
the choice of operating procedures also shapes the development of markets. Choices within 
an operating instrument matter as well as choices across operating instruments. 
2.3  Choosing monetary operations to further financial market development 
The syllogism advanced by this half of the paper can be simply put. The major premise is 
that the operations of a central bank confer liquidity on a particular market. The minor 
premise is that modern strategies for managing fiat money are silent on the composition of 
the balance sheet of the central bank. The conclusion therefore follows that central banks 
can choose monetary operating procedures in general, and operating instrument(s) in 
particular, in order to develop financial markets.  134  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
I contend that this conclusion applies to industrialised and emerging market economies alike. 
David Marshall’s historical review (2002, p 46) concluded “The Federal Reserve used its 
choice of open market instruments to influence the growth of financial markets in ways it 
deemed useful for the public interest”. More recently, the fine points of the Eurosystem’s 
operating policy have been tweaked most importantly to remove the incentives for massive 
overbidding in regular operations (maintenance period timing, maturity of operations, see 
ECB (2003)). In addition, however, moves have been made to damp overnight interest rate 
volatility, including more frequent fine-tuning operations (ECB (2007)). Damping such 
volatility has more to do with accommodating market participants in the EONIA swap market 
than any inherent monetary policy interest. From a developmental perspective, this 
accommodation makes sense. 
Two policies pursued by Bank Negara Malaysia provide examples of the choice of monetary 
instruments to further financial market development. The first concerns repos. As noted, a 
number of Asian central banks have depended more on repos to drain funds from the money 
market since the Asian financial crisis. However, the predominantly foreign assets held by 
these central banks have tended to place a limit on the available portfolio holdings of 
government paper that can be repo’ed out. Bank Negara Malaysia has borrowed government 
bonds from the buy and hold government provident fund that can be used in repo operations. 
Moreover, a comparison of the bidding in the resulting repo transactions with bidding at 
similar maturities for outright deposits with Bank Negara Malaysia revealed a preference for 
the repo over the outright deposit.  
The second policy involves the substitution of Bank Negara Malaysia securities for outright 
deposits as a means to drain liquidity from the money market. This required a change in the 
law that had limited outstanding Bank Negara Malaysia securities in relation to its capital. 
The increase in the central bank paper outstanding since the new law went into effect has 
been dramatic. Outstanding amounts tripled in  the first half o f2007 to over $17 billion 
equivalent. The substitution of negotiable securities for short-term deposits with the central 
bank has contributed materially to the liquidity of the money market. 
Bank Negara Malaysia bills and notes outstanding 
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3. Financial  market  development as a constraint on monetary 
operations 
The first half of this paper has argued that the choice of instruments and other aspects of a 
monetary policy operating framework affords policymakers the opportunity to advance the 
development of financial markets. At the same time, however, the development of financial 
markets constrains and challenges policymakers. The second half of this paper takes up 
these constraints and challenges. Constraints arise from the government and central bank 
balance sheets and from the growth of securities markets in previously bank-dominated 
financial systems.
7 The challenge to a central bank is to align its operations appropriately 
with financial development.  
3.1  Government and central bank balance sheets 
Government and central bank balance sheets impose important constraints on monetary 
operations. The first affects the availability of “risk-free” assets (a concept that dates almost 
to the period when the Federal Reserve was pegging Treasury interest rates). The second 
affects the likelihood that the money market is in structural deficit or surplus, and thus the 
character of the modal monetary operation (injecting or draining) and the availability of 
domestic assets to use in reversed transactions. 
The government balance sheet 
A most important constraint is the size of the government debt, which under normal 
circumstances itself reflects the flow of past fiscal deficits or surpluses. Thus, quite apart 
from the real bills doctrine, the Federal Reserve’s initial choice – that is, before World War I – 
of operating instrument was constrained by the small size of the federal government’s debt. 
Some Asian central banks before the Asian financial crisis also had little in the way of 
government debt with which to operate. As noted, at the very beginning of the present 
century, many committee meetings took place and journal articles were written on the 
premise that the stock of US government debt would shrink and possibly force the Federal 
Reserve to resort to private paper. 
Australia and New Zealand avoided the recessions and substantial foreign engagements that 
belied the fiscal expectations in the United States. Today, the prolonged fiscal surpluses of 
Australia and New Zealand have themselves posed challenges to the existing monetary 
policy procedures. The Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) has responded by operating in 
bank bills, much like the Federal Reserve once operated in BAs. The Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (2006), by contrast, has preferred to cash up its money market with massive foreign 
exchange swaps in order to avoid taking on such private sector assets (though it will from 
September 2007 accept IBRD and EIB paper denominated in New Zealand dollars).   
The central bank balance sheet 
The most economical, or perhaps minimalist, central bank balance sheet, that of the Federal 
Reserve, is not much larger than the monetary base.
8 That is, liabilities consist of 
outstanding currency and a smaller sum of bank reserves. The growth of outstanding 
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currency is accommodated by the Federal Reserve’s purchases of assets. The structural 
balance in the money market associated with an economical balance sheet is likely to be a 
deficit. That is, the central bank’s burden is likely to be to provide enough liquidity to the 
money market to accommodate cash and reserve demand (including that for clearing). Such 
an economical central bank has cash-needy entities (eg securities firms) as its natural 
counterparts. 
In many of the economies of East Asia, by contrast, the central bank’s abundant assets 
consist of foreign assets that stand at a multiple of the monetary base. Thus, the structural 
balance in the money market is likely to be a surplus and the central bank’s burden is likely 
to be to drain enough liquidity from the money market to prevent interest rates from plunging 
toward zero. In doing so, it will find it problematic to conduct reversed transactions against 
domestic assets like government securities, owing to its lack of holdings of the paper. Such a 
central bank has cash-rich banks and institutions as its natural counterparts. 
Cooperation between the debt manager and the central bank 
Government and central bank balance sheets impose less of a constraint if there is thorough 
cooperation between debt managers and central bankers. Considerable cooperation in East 
Asia and the Pacific has been evident in Singapore, Australia and India. In all three the 
government has issued (Singapore and India) or contrived to keep in existence (Australia) 
government debt in excess of the needs imposed by the public sector borrowing 
requirement. 
McCauley (2003 and 2006a) develops the argument for close cooperation between the debt 
manager and the central bank.
9 This has been adopted in India, where, notwithstanding a 
fiscal position that is only approaching long-run balanced growth, the government has agreed 
to overfund its fiscal needs. It thereby makes its debt available to the central bank to sterilise 
the effect on base money of intervention to resist the appreciation of the rupee. This has 
resulted in the filling in of the government yield curve, since the government has dropped its 
previous reluctance to issue short-term debt in view of its having a readily realisable financial 
asset as the counterpart of the overfunding (a blocked account at the Reserve Bank of India). 
3.2  The importance of securities markets: the view from corporate  
balance sheets 
Another constraint on a central bank’s choice of operating instrument is the importance of the 
securities markets in the overall financial system. If the flow of funds from the household 
sector to the non-financial business sector, or within the non-financial business sector, takes 
place primarily through a combination of institutional investors (mutual funds, insurance 
companies and pension funds) and securities markets, then operations confined to the 
banking system may not be transmitted effectively.  
Since the Asian financial crisis, bond markets have grown substantially in the region (Jiang 
and McCauley (2004)). Especially in Malaysia and Korea, not only have outstanding 
government bonds grown, but outstanding corporate bonds have also seen rapid growth (BIS 
(2006)). In Malaysia in particular, large firms rely more on corporate bonds than on bank 
loans. Under these circumstances, for instance, an increase in reserve requirements might 
just accelerate the shift from reliance on bank borrowing to reliance on bond issues rather 
than slow overall credit flowing to the corporate sector.  
                                                  
9  See Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp 634–636) for an interpretation of the “bills only” controversy in terms of 
the cooperation between debt managers at the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.  BIS Papers No 39  137
 
 
More generally, the cost of debt capital for the larger firms in the corporate sector no longer 
depends solely on the pricing of bank loans. Large firms’ decisions regarding the holding of 
inventories, the acquisition of land, and the purchase of capital equipment should be seen as 
increasingly a function of short-term paper and bond yields.  
Size of corporate bond market  
against corporate loans
1 
 
1  Excludes loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2007, p 92). 
3.3  Aligning monetary operations to financial market development 
In a bank-dominated financial system, the central bank can conduct monetary operations 
with banks and remain confident that its policy impulses will be transmitted to the banks’ 
customers, both depositors and borrowers. As securities markets gain in importance, 
however, the central bank faces the challenge of aligning its monetary policy operations with 
the altered flow of funds in the economy. 
This challenge can be visualised by a juxtaposition of the graph above, showing the reliance 
of large firms in Malaysia on the bond market, with the graph below, showing the security 
and deposit liabilities of Bank Negara Malaysia. The security liabilities consist of Bank 
Negara Malaysia bills and bonds and these showed an expansion in 2007 as noted above. 
The deposit liabilities are meant to capture the stock of outstanding operations in which 
banks in Malaysia tender for outright deposits at the central bank. These daily operations, for 
periods as short as days and as long as months, are the workhorse draining operation of the 
central bank. The outstanding stock is approximated by taking the banking system’s holding 
of deposits with the central bank (leaving the government’s deposits to one side) and 
subtracting required and excess reserves. The remainder can be taken as a proxy for the 
interest-bearing deposit liabilities of the central bank, which can be appropriately compared 
to the interest-bearing central bank securities outstanding. Both serve to drain liquidity, but 
one operates through bank balance sheets, and the other through the robustly expanding 
bond market.  
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Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. 
As can be seen, 2007’s increase in central bank bills and bonds has brought the security 
liabilities up to over a quarter of the deposit liabilities. Moreover, since the juxtaposition has 
not taken into account any repo transactions, the security-related draining operations are not 
fully captured by this comparison. It is fair to conclude that progress has been made in 
bringing central bank operations into alignment with the development of financial markets in 
this case.  
Deeper securities markets make it less likely that bank interest rates and those on short-term 
securities will become unhinged again. This was the experience in 2005 in the lead-up to the 
unpegging of the ringgit in July 2005. A great deal of speculative capital flowed into 
Malaysia’s financial markets in (a correct) anticipation of a move and in (an incorrect) 
expectation of a substantial immediate gain in the event of a move. Some of these funds 
were parked in short-term securities, especially at the short end of the Malaysian government 
securities market and in Bank Negara Malaysia bills. As a result of the weight of non-resident 
demand, the interest rates on such paper fell noticeably below the Bank Negara Malaysia 
overnight policy rate (see graph below). In effect the entire stock of such paper was acquired 
by non-residents, so that the higher opportunity cost of the banks able to participate in 
central bank draining operations became irrelevant to the pricing of the government and 
central bank paper in the market. Thus, the rates enforced by central bank operations in the 
interbank market lost their effect on the yields prevailing in the market for short-term 
government securities.  
More balance in the central bank operations between bank deposits and securities cannot 
prevent a recurrence of such an anomalous pattern of short-term interest rates, given the 
huge scale of capital flows that are being experienced in the region. The larger the stock of 
central bank paper, however, the less likely a recurrence becomes. This observation should 
not be read to suggest that there was a large loss associated with the disconnect between 
bank and short-term security interest rates. The speculative pressure did not extend far out 
along the yield curve, so that borrowing conditions for Malaysian firms were not greatly 
affected. And the anomalous pattern of rates did not last long. Speculative investors threw in 
the towel in August as it became clear that there would not be an uncontrolled pop of the 
exchange rate. Indeed, there was a huge outflow of funds from Malaysia in the second half of BIS Papers No 39  139
 
 
2005, which can be seen in the graph above as a fall in the outstanding draining operations, 
the counterpart of a substantial decline in foreign exchange reserves. This set of events, of 
course, had some parallel in China, which also depegged in July 2005. 
Money market interest rates in Malaysia, 2005–2007 
In percentage points 
Sources: Bloomberg; CEIC. 
4. Conclusions 
Monetary policy operating procedures and instruments offer central banks an opportunity to 
contribute to the development of financial markets. This may be most true for central banks 
in emerging markets, but the opportunity cost of holding the paper for the banks able to 
participate in central bank draining operations became irrelevant to the pricing of the paper in 
the market. The degrees of freedom in choosing instruments, given the lack of constraints 
flowing from the dominant strategy of managing fiat currencies to achieve low inflation and 
stable economic growth, can be put to good use.  
At the same time, the state of financial development constrains the choice of monetary 
operating procedures as well. When the debt stock of the government is small or the foreign 
assets of the monetary authority are large, monetary operations may end up with a character 
not observed elsewhere. Whether the debt stock of the government can be expanded to play 
a major role in the monetary operations of a central bank with large foreign assets depends 
on the particular circumstances of each country, and especially the relationship between the 
ministry of finance and the central bank. With or without this help, the central bank faces the 
challenge of aligning its operations to the main trends of financial development, including the 
growth of institutional investors and securities markets at the expense of bank intermediation. 
References 
Archer, D (2006): “Implications of recent changes in banking for the conduct of monetary 
policy”, BIS Papers, no 28, pp 123–151. 
Bank for International Settlements (2005): The triennial central bank survey: foreign 
exchange and derivative markets activity in 2004, March. 
0
1
2
3
4
Jan-05 May-05 Sep-05 Jan-06 May-06 Sep-06 Jan-07 May-07  Sep-07
Overnight interbank rate
12-month T-bill
Jan.05  May  .05  Sep  .05  Jan.06  May.06  Sep.06  Jan.07 May  .07  Sep  .07140  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
——— (2006):  Developing corporate bond markets in Asia (Proceedings of a BIS/PBC 
seminar held in Kunming, China on 17–18 November 2005), BIS Papers, no 26, February. 
——— (2007): The triennial central bank survey of foreign exchange and derivatives market 
activity in April 2007 (December). 
Bank Negara Malaysia (2007): Financial stability and payments system report 2006. 
Bank of England (2007): The framework for the Bank of England’s operations in the sterling 
money markets (the ‘Red Book’), February. 
Bank of Korea (2002): Monetary Policy in Korea 
Available at http://www.bok.or.kr/content/old/attach/00000888/200301161403380.pdf 
Borio, C E V (1997): “Implementation of monetary policy in industrial countries: a survey”, 
BIS Economic Papers, no 47, August. 
Borio, C E V and R N McCauley (2001): “Comparing monetary policy operating procedures in 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand”, in Financial Markets and Policies in East Asia, 
Gordon de Brouwer, ed (London: Routledge), pp 253–285. 
Broaddus, J A and M Goodfriend (2001): “What assets should the Federal Reserve buy?”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, vol 87, no 1 (Winter),   
pp 7–22.  
Central Bank of China (2006): CBC purposes and functions, December. 
Dasri, T (1990): The reserve requirement as a monetary instrument in the SEACEN 
countries, The South East Asian Central Banks Research and Training Centre, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. 
European Central Bank (2003): “Changes to the Eurosystem’s operational framework for 
monetary policy”, ECB Monthly bulletin, August, pp 41–54. 
——— (2007): “Box: Liquidity conditions and monetary policy operations from 14 February to 
14 May 2007”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, August, pp 31–33. 
Friedman, B M (1999): “The future of monetary policy: The central bank as an army with only 
a signal corps?”, International Finance, 2, 321–338. 
Friedman, M and A J Schwartz (1963): A monetary history of the United States (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research). 
Ho, C (2008): “Implementing monetary policy in the 2000s: operating procedures in Asia and 
beyond”, forthcoming BIS working paper. 
Hohensee, M and K Lee (2006): “A survey of Asian hedging markets: a description of Asian 
derivatives markets from a practical perspective”, in Asian bond markets: issues and 
prospects, BIS Papers, no 30, November, pp 261–281. 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2007): Annual report, 2006. 
Jiang, G and R N McCauley (2004): “Asian local currency bond markets”, BIS  Quarterly 
Review, June, pp 67–79. 
Kneeshaw, J T and P Van den Bergh (1989): “Changes in central bank money market 
operating procedures in the 1980s”, BIS Economic Papers, no 23, January. 
Kohn, D L (2002): “Panel: Implications of declining Treasury debt: What should the Federal 
Reserve do as Treasury debt is repaid?”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol 34, no 3, 
part 2, August, pp 941–945. 
LaRoche, R K (1993): “Bankers acceptances”, in Instruments of the money market 
(Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond), pp 128–38. BIS Papers No 39  141
 
 
Lumpkin, S A (1993): “Repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements”, in Instruments of 
the money market (Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond), pp 59–74. 
Marshall, D (2002): “Origins of the use of Treasury debt in open market operations: lessons 
for the present”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic perspectives, Q1, pp 45–54. 
McCauley, R N (2002): “Panel: Implications of declining Treasury debt: International market 
implications of declining Treasury debt”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol 34, no 3, 
part 2, August, pp 952–966. 
——— (2003): “Unifying public debt markets in East Asia”, BIS Quarterly Review, December, 
pp 89–98. 
———  (2006a): “Consolidating the public bond markets of Asia”, in Asian bond markets: 
issues and prospects, BIS Papers, no 30, November, pp 82–98. 
———  (2006b): “Internationalising a currency: the case of the Australian dollar”, BIS 
Quarterly Review, December, pp 41–54. 
McCauley, R and G Jiang (2004): “Diversifying with Asian local currency bonds”, BIS 
Quarterly Review, September, pp 51–66. 
Meulendyke, A-M (1998): US monetary policy and financial markets (New York: Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York). 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (2003): “Monetary policy operations in Singapore”, 
monograph. Available at 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/publications/monographs/info_papers_and_monographs.html 
Papadia, F and F Würtz (2007): “Central bank balance sheets: Comparison, trends and 
some thoughts”, in Age F P Bakker and Ingmar R V van Herpt, eds, Central bank reserve 
management: New trends, from liquidity to return (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp 193–216.  
Patrawimolpon, P (2002): “Open market operations & effectiveness of monetary policy”, 
Occasional Papers, no 34, The South East Asian Central Banks Research and Training 
Centre, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
Reserve Bank of Australia (2003): “The Reserve Bank’s open market operations”, Reserve 
Bank of Australia Bulletin, June. 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2006): Reform of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s 
liquidity management operations, June. 
Ritter, L S, ed (1980): Selected papers of Allan Sproul (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York). 
Ryoo, S (2006): Operational framework of monetary policy in the SEACEN countries, The 
South East Asian Central Banks Research and Training Centre, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.   
Sakakibara, E and A Kondoh (1984): “Study on the internationalisation of Tokyo’s money 
markets”, Japan Center for International Finance Policy Study Series, no 1, June. 
Tuaño-Amador, M C N (2003): “Central banking in the Philippines since 1993”, in Money & 
banking in the Philippines, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
Van’t dack, J (1999): “Implementing monetary policy in emerging market economies: an 
overview of issues”, BIS Policy Papers, no 5, pp 3–72. 
Woodford, M (2000): “Monetary policy in a world without money”, International Finance, 3:2, 
pp 229–260. 